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Introduction
It is widely believed that managers have a huge impact on the success of organizations.
The ability of the person at the top affects an organization through a number of channels and should trickle down through the hierarchy and thus have a strong effect on organizational performance (Rosen, 1982) . But how big are these effects? What difference does the quality of the single person at the top make for the overall performance of the organization? There is a recent empirical literature which aims at measuring the contribution of individual managers to the performance of their organization (see e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Lazear et al., 2014; Graham et al., 2012) exploiting the variation which arises from the fact that, in the course of the careers, some managers are active in several organizations or functions which allows to disentangle their contribution from other factors. However, this is a difficult endeavor as CEOs, for instance, typically stay at the top of a specific firm for longer time periods and work as CEOs only for a very small number of different firms (very often only one) in their lifetime -which limits the scope to measure their contribution to organizational success.
In this paper, we consider this issue in the context of professional sports which has several advantages for the question at hand (apart from being of interest in its own right):
(i) team performance is publicly observable on a weekly basis and (ii) managers move very frequently between teams -much more frequently than managers in firms. And observing the same manager in different organizations thus using different sets of resources and working with different people is crucial to measure a manager's contribution to overall success. We follow the approach applied by Abowd et al. (1999) (who use wages of employees working for different employers) and Bertrand and Schoar (2003) (who study CEO's working for different firms) and evaluate the impact of individual managers by estimating OLS regressions that include both team and manager fixed effects using data from the last 21 seasons of the Bundesliga, Germany's major soccer league.
1 We then 1 Another strand of literature has followed a different route in order to measure managerial quality in professional sports: In a first step, a (stochastic) efficiency frontier is estimated for each team, and then in a second step, the quality of a manager is assessed in terms of the team's proximity to this frontier during his term, see e.g., Carmichael and Thomas (1995) ; Fizel and D'Itry (1997) ; Dawson 1 investigate the obtained manager fixed effects further and, for instance, find that teams employing a manager at the 75% ability percentile gain on average 0.25 points per game more than those employing a manager at the 25% ability percentile. This corresponds to a difference of 18% of the average number of points awarded per game. We also conduct a cross validation exercise by estimating manager fixed effects using the data only up to a certain season and then investigate whether these fixed effects are useful to predict future performance. We find that this indeed is the case: these measures of managerial ability have a substantial predictive power for future performance of the teams employing the respective manager.
The paper thus contributes to the growing literature empirically analyzing the impact of managers on different economic measures, such as corporate behavior (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003) , corporate tax avoidance (Dyreng et al., 2010) , managerial compensation (Graham et al., 2012) , or disclosure choices (Bamber et al., 2010) . In a prominent study, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) try to assess the impact of managers on firm performance, analyzing to what extent manager fixed effects can explain the observed heterogeneity in corporate behavior. They use a manager-firm matched panel data set that comprises different CEOs in different firms and focus only on those firms that have employed at least one mover manager, i.e. a manager who can be observed in at least two firms.
The results show that manager fixed effects are important determinants in explaining corporate behavior. More recently, Lazear et al. (2014) study data from a large call center where supervisors move between teams (and team composition varies over time) which allows to disentangle the effect of different supervisors on performance. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to apply this idea to the professional sports sector.
Moreover, all managers in our study operate in the same industry, and this industry attracts a huge amount of public attention. As a result, most of these managers are very well-known to the interested public, so that the estimated individual fixed effects are of interest in their own right. Furthermore, we show that the estimated effects are useful to predict performance later in the managers' careers. Hence, our results can be helpful in identifying "under-valued" managers.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: We first describe the data and the empirical framework in section 2. In section 3 we present the key results, in particular with respect to the estimated manager fixed effects and the resulting heterogeneity of managers. In section 4 we cross-validate our results by estimating first manager and team fixed-effects for a restricted sample, and then use these estimates to predict team performance for the remaining seasons in our data set. Section 5 discusses possible caveats of our framework and concludes.
Empirical Framework

Data
The German Bundesliga -one of the strongest and economically most viable soccer leagues in the world -consists of 18 teams, and in each season, each team plays twice against each other team (one home match for each team), resulting in two half-seasons with 17 match days each. In each match, a winning (losing) team is awarded 3 (0) points, a draw results in 1 point for each team, and teams are ranked according to their accumulated points.
2 Our data set contains all Bundesliga matches played in the 21 seasons from 1993/94 until 2013/14 (9 matches played on each of 714 match days leading to a total of 6426 matches).
In our analysis, the unit of observation is the performance of a manager-team pair during a half-season (that is, match days 1 through 17 and 18 through 34, respectively).
Therefore our dependent variable (Points) is the average number of points per game gained in the course of a half-season.
3
Throughout we refer to a spell as a non-interrupted relationship between a manager-2 When several teams have accumulated the same number of points, the goal difference is used as the tie-breaking rule. In the first two season covered 1993/94 and 1994/95 the Bundesliga still applied a "two-point rule" where the winner of a game was awarded two points instead of three. We converted the data from these two seasons to the three-point rule.
team pair.
4 To be considered in the subsequent analysis, we require that a spell must last for at least 17 consecutive matches in the Bundesliga, and throughout the paper we refer to this as the Footprint condition (F). 5 This condition excludes observations from managers who are responsible for a team only for a small number of games. 6 While such short-term managers might have an impact on the team's short-term performance, they are unlikely to "leave a footprint". Out of the 176 managers in our data set, 116 remain after condition F is applied.
7
Spells satisfying condition F often stretch over several half-seasons (thereby leading to multiple observations for our dependent variable), but the time interval of a spell does typically not divide evenly into half-seasons. The reason is that managers are frequently hired and dismissed within (half-) seasons.
8 In these cases, we consider the performance in all half-seasons of the spell, weighted with the number of matches in the respective half-season. 
Identification of Manager-Fixed Effects
We consider the following empirical model to explain the performance of team i under manager k in half season t
where the dependent variable measures the average number of points per game won by team i during the half-season t = 1, ...42.
We apply a parsimonious approach and include only fixed effects for teams (γ i ), managers (λ k ), and half seasons (α t ) as explanatory variables. Including more controls such as the team's budgets (absolute or relative) is not necessarily desirable from a methodological point of view, as a team's budget will also depend on performance and thus will be influenced by the current manager. 10 Obviously, γ i and λ k cannot be identified separately when the respective teams and managers are only jointly observed (that is, team i is only observed with manager k, and manager k is only observed with team i) since both variables are perfectly collinear in this case. Hence, to identify the different fixed effects, (at least some) managers and teams must be observed with multiple partners (see e.g., Abowd et al., 1999; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003) .
In the context of European professional soccer, the rate of manager turnover is quite high. One reason is the high frequency of within-season managerial change as discussed above, but replacing managers between seasons is also quite common. 11 As a result, our data contains a large number of managers which are observed with many different teams (up to 7), and many teams which are observed under many different managers (up to 13) which creates a large amount of variation in observed manager-team matches. From a methodological point of view, this renders this industry particularly suitable for the identification of manager fixed-effects.
Throughout, we distinguish between two types of managers: movers and non-movers.
We refer to a manager as a (non-)mover when he is observed with at least two different (only one) team(s). Out of the 116 managers satisfying the footprint condition F, 44
(38%) managers are movers, while 72 (62%) are non-movers.
As already explained, for all teams employing only non-mover managers, it is not possible to disentangle team and manager fixed-effects, and therefore to identify a separate manager fixed-effect. In contrast, for all teams observed with at least one mover manager, manager fixed-effects can be estimated also for the non-mover managers. In line with Bertrand and Schoar (2003) , we require that teams are observed with at least one mover, and refer to this as the mover-team (MT) condition. This condition is satisfied by 29 out of the 37 teams in our data set. The remaining 8 teams are excluded from the analysis. 12 The same is true for the 13 managers (none of them eliminated by condition F, all non-movers) who have been employed by these teams, leading to 13 excluded spells in addition to those already excluded due to condition F as explained above.
13 Our final data set covers 103 managers (44 movers, and 59 non-movers), 29 teams, 206 spells, and 764 observations for the dependent variable Points. Table 2 shows descriptive information for the 29 teams in our final data set, which illustrates again the frequency of managerial changes: For example, almost 60 % of these teams have employed at least five (non-interim) managers. And 20 % of the teams have even had at least ten managers during the last 21 seasons.
Finally, Figure 1 and Table 3 give further descriptive information concerning the dependent variable Points and the spells in our final data. Obs. per spell refers to the number of half-seasons per spell. Only teams after application conditions F and MT. * Points refer to the average number of points per game per half-season, weighted by the number of games of the respective manager-team pair in a half-season. Note that manager-team pairs win on average 1.41 points per game. On average, a spell lasts for slightly less than 60 matches, and the 103 managers in the final data set are observed with about two spells on average, but this number can be as large as eight.
Empirical Analysis
We now investigate whether the identity of the managers indeed has a significant impact on the team's performance. In a first step, we follow Bertrand and Schoar (2003) Table 4 shows the results of three different models which differ with respect to the set of independent variables used. Model 1 contains only half-season fixed effects, Model 2 contains both half-season and team fixed effects, while in Model 3 manager fixed-effects are included in addition. Of course, the explanatory power sharply increases once team fixed effects are included (Model 2). 14 When comparing Models 2 and 3, the inclusion of manager fixed-effects leads to an increase of the R 2 by 11.4 percentage points (or 32.1%), and the adjusted R 2 increases by 2.5 percentage points (or 8.6%). Moreover, the F-Test for the joint significance of the manager fixed-effects is highly significant (p < 0.01).
The (Joint) Impact of Managers on Team Performance
14 Note that half-season fixed effects have very low explanatory power and the reason for this is simple: if there were no draws, performance in soccer would be a zero-sum game. Hence, half-season fixed effects capture changes in the frequencies of draws (where one point is awarded to each of the two teams) and wins (three and zero points are awarded to the winner and loser, respectively) across half-seasons.
Estimation of Manager Fixed Effects: Comparing the Performance Contributions of Managers
We now analyze the individual manager fixed-effects in more detail. As explained above and analogous to the argument by Abowd et al. (1999) , manager fixed-effects can be estimated not only for the 44 movers in our sample, but also for the 59 non-movers (such as Pep Guardiola, Luis van Gaal) as long as their only team is also observed with at least one mover, i.e., satisfies condition MT. Note however, that the identification of the fixed effect of non-movers must come from disentangling it from the fixed effect of their (only) team. This might be problematic if this team is only observed with a few other managers. In contrast, for movers we can exploit the larger variation since several teams and their respective team fixed-effects are involved. Consequently, we first focus our discussion on the fixed effects for the mover managers. For the sake of comparison, the right part of Table 5 ranks the managers simply with respect to the average number of points won with their respective teams in the considered spells. As is evident, this procedure favors those managers who have worked for the big teams such as Bayern Munich, Borussia Dortmund or Schalke 04, which have more financial resources to hire the best players. Comparing these two rankings leads to remarkable differences: For example, Giovanni Trappatoni is ranked second using this points won by all teams (see Table 3 ).
In summary, our results are in line with previous results from other industries such as Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Graham et al. (2012) who find that executives are an important factor determining organizational performance. Moreover, the degree of heterogeneity between individuals with respect to this ability seems remarkable, in par-ticular as we take into account only the top segment of the labor market for football managers, i.e. our sample of managers already contains a selected group of the most able ones as each single year, only 24 new managers complete a mandatory training program for head coaches organized by the German Football Association (DFB). All in all, our results do not support the argument that such mandatory training programs would make the population of Bundesliga managers quite homogenous (see e.g., Breuer and Singer, 1996) .
Furthermore, our results indicate that the sporting and financial implications of decisions concerning the hiring of managers can be substantial: for example, 33 out of the 63 teams which were either directly relegated to the second division or had to play an additional relegation round to avoid relegation, would have been saved from relegation respectively the relegation round if they had won 5 additional points in the course of the season.
16 According to our analysis, this corresponds to the difference between a manager at the 20%-and 50%-percentile. Table 8 in Appendix A reports also the fixed effects estimates for non-mover managers (in grey), i.e. those that we observe only with a single team (and where this team satisfies condition MT). As argued by Abowd et al. (1999) , these fixed effects are also identified, but the estimates rely on a precise estimation of the respective team fixed-effects. This seems a strong requirement for those teams who are observed with only a few other managers (mostly non-movers themselves). Given the few sources of variation and the small number of observations in such cases, the disentangling of the two fixed effects does not always seem convincing and leads to implausible results. Two cases in point here are Thomas Tuchel (Mainz) and Peter Pacult (1860 Munich) whose manager fixedeffects seem excessively high (rank 1 and 3, respectively, in Table 8 ) in the light of their accomplishments. In contrast, as can be seen from Table 9 (also in Appendix A), the estimated team fixed effects for their teams Mainz and 1860 Munich (left column) appear to be excessively low (rank 29 and 26, respectively) compared to the performance of these teams measured in terms of points won (rank 11 and 13, respectively, right column).
Hence, we feel that the estimates for such non-mover managers that were employed by teams that did not employ many movers have to be interpreted with caution.
Cross Validation: Predicting Future Performance
Finally, we want to cross-validate our estimates of the managers' abilities, by analyzing whether the estimated fixed effects are able to predict future performance. The question we ask is the following: if we use our approach to obtain estimates of managers' abilities using all the data up to a certain date t which corresponds to the beginning of a season -to what extent do these estimates help to predict performance of the teams employing these managers in the season that follows? In order to do so, we proceed in several steps:
First, starting with the beginning of season 2004/05 (which corresponds to half-season 23 in our data set) we estimate manager and team fixed effects restricting the data set to all outcomes prior to the season we want to predict. Hence, for each manager k and team i and date t ∈ {23, 25, 27, ..41}, we obtain a moving time series of fixed effectsλ The key question is whether these estimated manager fixed effects have predictive power for the team's performance in the subsequent year. Table 6 shows the regression results, where column (1) includes only our estimates for team strength while in column (2), we add our estimates for managers' abilities. We find indeed that both our measures of team strength and managers' abilities are helpful in predicting subsequent performance. Including our proxies for the managers' abilities raises the adjusted R 2 by 33% from 0.144 to 0.191 and the coefficient of managerial ability is significant at the 1% level. Following Angrist and Pischke (2008) in interpreting regressions as approximations to the conditional expectation function, we thus conclude that our estimates (1) und (2) In columns (3) and (4) we compare these predictive regressions to an alternative way of predicting team performance on the basis of the average number of points won by a team (with all its previous managers) and its current manager (with all his previous teams) in the past. While the average number of points won by teams in the past is indeed a valuable predictor for future performance (see column (3)), the average number of points won by its manager in the past has no additional explanatory power at all (column (4)). Hence, if we want to disentangle the contribution of a manager from the underlying strength of a team to predict the team's performance, our "purged" measure of ability is more valuable than measures which are simply based on past performance outcomes.
Finally, Table 7 is very similar to Table 6 , where we have only replaced the fixed effects of managers and teams as estimated up to date t−1 with their respective percentile scores (i.e. the manager with the highest fixed effect at date t − 1 has a percentile score of 1 and the median manager a percentile score of 0.5). Again, the percentile rank of managers has predictive power only when the ranking occurs according to their fixed (1) und (2) (2)), but not when ranked with respect to their average points won in the past (column (4)). Moreover, it is interesting to note that the slope of the manager rank (0.335) attains a value of about 46% of the slope of the team strength (0.731).
Given that it seems much easier to replace a manager with a better one than to replace a whole team, picking a better manager indeed seems to be a key lever to increase team performance.
Conclusion
We have analyzed the impact of managers on the performance of their teams in the context of professional sports. In particular, we have estimated average additional performance contributions for individual managers by making use of the high turnover rates in the Bundesliga which allows to disentangle manager effects from the strength of their respective teams. We found a strong variation in these performance contributions. For instance, our estimates indicate that a manager at the 25% percentile in the ability distribution wins 18% more points per game than one at the 75% percentile. Moving from the median to the best manager in the sample is associated with a 33% higher performance in terms of the points awarded. A more problematic assumption is the stability of the (relative) strengths of teams across the considered time period which may vary over time due to changes in the financial strength of teams, or the quality their executive and/or supervisory boards.
Using shorter time intervals (for example, by including team/season fixed effects covering, say, five seasons) would relax the stability assumption. However, apart from the fact that any such division of our data set into 5-year periods would appear arbitrary to some degree, this also raises collinearity issues due to a larger congruence of the time periods in which manager-team pairs are observed. For example, when a manager is observed with a team for a whole five-year period, then part of his impact will be picked up by the respective team/season fixed effect and vice versa. Clearly, this problem could be relaxed as data from more upcoming seasons becomes available, and it would be an interesting topic for future research to further investigate the robustness of our results. 
